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Abstract
This paper analyzes the production of fundamental research as a coordination game played by scholars.
In the model, scholars decide to adopt a new idea only if they believe that a critical mass of peers
is following a similar research strategy. If researchers observe only a noisy idiosyncratic signal of the
true scientic potential of a new idea, we show that the game presents a single threshold equilibrium.
In this environment, fundamental research proceeds with large structural breaks followed by long
periods of time in which new ideas are unsuccessful. The likelihood of a new idea emerging depends
on various parameters, including the rewards of working in the old paradigm, the critical mass of
researchers required to create a new school of thought and scholarsability to properly assess the
scientic value of new ideas.
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1 Introduction
Fundamental research frequently progresses in a discontinuous manner, with structural breaks
driven by major innovations that are followed by long periods of exploitation of the results of
such structural breaks (Bramoullé and Saint-Paul, 2010). In his masterpiece, The Structure
of Scientic Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn (1962) o¤ers substantial historical evidence that
demonstrates that established research paradigms prove to be extremely resilient and that
only the inadvertent emergence of critical anomalies can generate paradigm change.1 In-
deed, many good ideas, that is ideas with scientic value higher than the research produced
in the existing paradigm, fail to be implemented or take an abnormal long period of time to
be recognized as such. In the "small world of economics", Gans and Sheppard (1994) provide
evidence about the high rejection rates and unbelievable delays in publication of papers that
are now considered as cornerstones of modern economics. In the opposite direction, Gardner
(1957), Stephan (1996), Diamond (1996) and Abrahamson (2009) point out the emergence
of fads and fashions in science, where scholars rush on developing ideas that ultimately prove
to be sterile.
This paper aims to provide an explanation for these "bumpy" output trajectories in
fundamental research by accounting for the coordination risk perceived by researchers con-
sidering whether to pursue or adopt a new idea. In scientic research, the scholar exposes his
ndings to a large community of peers, and takes the challenge of being judged and criticized
by them. Yet humans fear criticism and peer rejection. They can hedge against this risk by
following the heard, a psychological bias emphasized by Keynes (1936: 158), who noticed
1 As key examples, Kuhn discusses the discovery of oxygen in the late XVIIIth century, the discovery of
X-rays, and the discovery of the Leyden jar.
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that "worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to
succeed unconventionally".2 Sociologists of science have argued that success of a new idea
depends on whether it will manage or not to generate a su¢ ciently large degree of consen-
sus (Shwed and Bearman, 2010). Taking this logic one step further, a new idea will reach
the "science status" only if a critical mass of researchers adopt it, then test, extend, and
develop applications of that idea. Given that research programs are typically condential
(Bobtche¤ et al. 2013), a researcher will decide to develop a new idea only if he believes
that a su¢ cient number of researchers are following the same research strategy. Knowledge
of the belief formation mechanism is thus fundamental to gaining a deeper understanding of
the idea adoption mechanism.
In this context, the researchers problem can be analyzed as a typical coordination game
with strategic complementarities. With complete information and identical players, such
games present multiple equilibria; optimal actions are motivated by beliefs, and equilibrium
beliefs are correct, but beliefs are ultimately undetermined, which generates the multiplicity
of equilibria (Morris and Shin, 2001; 2004). Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) proved that this
indeterminacy can be removed in a two-person game if players observe only a biased signal of
the variable dening the state of the economy. In this case, individuals should consider not
only their own assessment of the economy but also the possible beliefs that the other player
may hold regarding the same state of the economy. These authors showed that this type
of game in which beliefs are no longer common knowledge presents a unique equilibrium
of a particular form: there is a critical state of the economy above which both players
2 The citation is reported by Diamond (1996) in his analysis of the emergence of fads in science.
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take the high-risk high-yield strategy and below which they adopt the opposite wait-and-
see strategy. Morris and Shin (1998, 2001) extended this analysis to n-player coordination
games in which each player obtains an idiosyncratic signal regarding the underlying state of
the economy. If the private signal is su¢ ciently precise, then this "global game" also presents
a single threshold equilibrium in which players follow an equilibrium "switching strategy".
An impressive body of nancial economics literature has applied this equilibrium concept to
a variety of issues, including bank runs, corporate and public debt illiquidity, credit risk, and
currency attacks, among others.3
Global games methodology can provide an interesting explanation for the emergence of
new elds of research, because it allows to address the coordination problems of scholars
whose e¤orts are rewarded only if the consensus is ultimately reached. In general, new ideas
have their own scientic value, related to the benets society can get from its successful
implementation. The model assumes that during any time period, nature draws one new
idea from a known statistical distribution of scientic values. The key assumption is that
researchers observe only a biased signal of the true scientic potential of any new idea. This
idiosyncratic bias is also distributed across scholars, and is related to their own education,
experience and personality presenting a di¤erent degree of scientic skepticism. Given this
individual-specic signal, researchers must choose between continuing their work in the exist-
ing paradigm and obtaining safe but modest payo¤s or taking risks with the aim of developing
a new idea. The new idea will create a successful eld of research (a new paradigm) only
if a critical mass of researchers simultaneously decides to adopt the idea. If this critical
3 See, for instance: Hellwig (2002), Morris and Shin (2004, 2009), Angeletos and Werning (2006), Angeletos
et al. (2007), Metz (2011). See Jorge and Rochas (2014) for a survey.
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mass is reached, then the rewards of adopting the new idea depend on its scientic value;
conversely, if critical mass is not reached, then the scholar who has spent time developing
the new idea will not recover his investment. In this paper, we show that there is an equilib-
rium cuto¤ scientic value above which a new strand of research is created and below which
the new strand fails to emerge. This result can explain the observed stair-step pattern of
scientic discovery without any additional assumptions regarding researcher heterogeneity
such as individual-specic preferences. It also provides a rationale for the emergence of fads
in science in times of major scientic uncertainty.
Our analysis focuses on one representative stage of a repeated game. In our model,
scholars do not improve their ability to assess the true scientic value of a new idea from one
period to another. The assumption of a limited learning ability is quite plausible in the realm
of scientic research, where often new theories will "toll the bell" of incumbent ones. A more
complex model would introduce two generations of scholars, "young" and "old", and consider
that experienced scholars might have a di¤erent ability to recognize "true science" than the
young ones. But whether experienced scholars have a better or worse ability to detect original
research, this question is open to debate. In Kuhns (1962) views, experienced scholars are
sometimes too close to the old paradigm and would resist adopting new ideas. Should this
be the case, they would not behave as Bayesian learning agents.4
One criticism to Morris and Shins (1998, 2001) main result on the uniqueness of the
"threshold equilibrium" was raised by Atkeson (2000), followed by Angeletos and Werning
(2006). They showed that once asset prices are introduced in the model, the multiplicity of
4 See Angeletos and Werning (2007) for a dynamic global game with learning about the distribution of
signals.
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equilibria specic to games with complete information reappears. Our analysis is insulated
from this type of criticism, since there is no stricto-sensu market for scientic ideas which
are freely disseminated.
Thus our analysis can be seen as a contribution to the theoretical literature on the
choice, dynamics and success of research programs, one important subeld in the economics
of science (Diamond, 1996). Among the most relevant related papers, Brock and Durlauf
(1999) develop a model of theory choice in which scholars not only care about their private
assessment of the scientic value of the theory, but also are subject to conformism, i.e., they
prefer to embrace ideas similar to ideas adopted by others. Their analysis provides a solid
explanation for why fundamental research frequently moves from extended disagreement to
extended consensus. In a similar vein, Bramoullé and Saint-Paul (2010) analyze the dynamics
of fundamental research by considering that scientists derive utility from recognition by
other scientists; depending on parameters, the dynamics of research either are smoothly
increasing or alternate between periods of innovation and periods of exploitation of the
results of research. Faria et al. (2011) analyze paradigm depletion as a dynamic game where
the paradigm is modelled as a non renewable natural resource; they determine the optimal
pace of paradigm exploitation. Barraquer and Tan (2011) introduce a signaling model in
which young scholars do not take the risk of working on new ideas and continue to develop
obsolete but highly technical ideas simply to demonstrate their skills to future employers.
Hopenhayn and Squintani (2011) and Bobtche¤ et al. (2013) study the ow of research as
the equilibrium of a preemption game in which playersprivate information stochastically
increases over time and in which the value of innovation is uncertain. Besancenot and Dogguy
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(2014) apply the mean eld game theory to analyze how scholarsoptimal choice of research
topics determines paradigm shifts. These authors also acknowledge that the utility of an
individual scholar is positively related to the number of scholars who work within his own
strand of research.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the main assumptions.
Section 3 solves the model for the equilibrium cuto¤ scientic value and cuto¤ signal and
performs some comparative statics. The last section presents our conclusions.
2 Main assumptions
The analysis distinguishes between "Pioneers", responsible of generating new ideas, and
"Normal scholars". We assume that the idea generation process is exogenously given: during
any given time period, one such Pioneer launches one new idea, for instance as a published
paper. The scientic value of a new idea, which refers to the benet that the successful
implementation of this idea might bring to society, is denoted by , with  2 R. Observed
over a long period of time,  appears to be a random variable.
Normal scholars are represented by a unit mass of identical risk-neutral researchers in-
dexed by i 2 [0; 1]. To keep the model as simple as possible, it is assumed that these
scholars have di¤use priors on the distribution of scientic values, that is they believe that
  unif( 1;+1):5 These high-skill professionals monitor the publication ow and can de-
tect new ideas. When an original paper emerges, each normal researcher can choose between
investing time and e¤ort to develop the high-yield, high-risk new idea as an early adopter,
5 Di¤use priors allow to work with simple formula and present no di¢ culty as long as we are concerned
with conditional beliefs (Metz, 2003; Veldkamp, 2011). The logic of the model would not change if instead of
di¤use priors we use another distribution, but the uniqueness of the equilibrium is no longer granted.
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or continuing his research activity in the old strand of research, and eventually move to the
new idea later on as a follower. Let ` denote the number of researchers who decide to adopt
the new idea in the rst place, with ` 2 [0; 1]:
Consistent with Kuhn (1962), working to develop and extend an existing paradigm (as
a "puzzle solver") is a low-risk activity, but the scientic value of such developments is
also likely to be relatively modest. We will assume that ideas produced in the old strand
of research have a predetermined scientic value equal to s; with s > 0. In line with the
consensus-based denition of science, a new strand of research emerges only when a critical
mass of scholars decide to develop the new idea. In other words, a new idea will not obtain
"science" status if it is not challenged, tested, copied, and applied to various problems and
subelds. Let v denote the critical mass of researchers required to create a new strand of
research, with v 2 (0; 1) being known and exogenously given.
A scholars reward from research may be multi-dimensional (Merton, 1957; Stephan,
1996); a successful research programme might lead to a better position, a better wage,
enhanced reputation and social status, more citations, and better media coverage, among
other benets. For purposes of the subsequent analyses, we convert and collapse all these
benets into a single-dimension monetary equivalent. Following Merton (1957), it has been
recognized that the highest rewards in science go to Pioneers (not modelled explicitly in our
paper), then to early adopters. To acknowledge for this "competitive reward mechanism",
we assume that a scholar who continues working in the old paradigm receives a certain payo¤
of s; identical to the social value of the idea. On the other hand, a scholar who decides to
develop a new idea as an early adopter will get a payo¤ equal to the social value of the new
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idea () if the new strand of research is established (`  v), or zero if the new strand of
research fails to achieve legitimacy (` < v):6
In other words, even if the idea is excellent, if no one else is adopting it, the idea will
not reach universal recognition, and the value of the research for the researcher will be zero
(i.e., the scholar cannot recover his investment in time and e¤ort). On the contrary, if a
critical mass of researchers is adopting the idea, then the idea will attain "science" status
and will produce a gain that is here assumed to be identical to the scientic value of the
idea. A scholar will not choose to work on a new idea if he believes that in case of success of
the idea his reward will be lower than working in the old strand of research. These beliefs
depend on the signal he observes, given the quality of the signals. Given our assumption
on the distribution of , we cannot rule out the theoretical possibility that in some special
conditions (to be dened later on), a very poor idea ( < 0) can originate a strand of "pseudo-
science". Our payo¤ structure tells us that if one scholar works on a poor idea but the idea
does not become visible, his payo¤ is zero. Yet, if enough scholars work on developing a
poor idea and manage to create a "pseudo-science", their reward should be in line with the
reputation from developing an absurd research domain.7
6 This linear payo¤ function implicitly assumes that the private value of a scientic research (for the
scholar) is identical to its social value. It must be acknowledged that in some cases, private and social value
of scientic discovery might diverge.
7 If we want to rule out the emergence of pseudo-sciences and consider that all ideas have positive scientic
value, we could alternatively assume that   unif [0;+1):
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In sum, the payo¤ ui of a scholar i 2 [0; 1] has the following structure:
ui =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Adopt the new idea
8>><>>:
New strand of research emerges (`  v) : get 
New strand of research fails (` < v) : get 0
Keep on working in the old school: get s
Notice that at the next stage of the game, the same "static" decision replicates identically.
If a new strand of research emerges at period t; in t+1 it will become "old", and will deliver
the payo¤ s both to early adopters and followers.
If  is common knowledge and larger than s, then the scholarscoordination game presents
two trivial Nash equilibria. The rst is the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in which all re-
searchers participate in the new program of research: because ` = 1 > v; the new topic
emerges as a new paradigm, and each scholar receives  > s. Thus, a researcher who chooses
to work in the old paradigm would regret his choice. Because the gain of each researcher
ultimately depends on the decisions of others, this equilibrium involves a form of coordina-
tion risk. The second equilibrium is the zero-risk, Pareto-dominated equilibrium in which
all researchers continue working in the old paradigm and receive the meagre but certain s;
because ` = 0 < v; the new paradigm does not emerge. If only one researcher decides to
pursue the new eld of research, his contribution alone is insu¢ cient to allow the topic to
generate a new eld of research, and he would regret his choice (0 < s): This is a typical
multiple equilibria conguration: which of the two equilibria actually prevails depends on
scholarsbeliefs, but these beliefs are undetermined by the model.
However, in the world of research, there is a strong element of subjectivity in assessing
the scientic potential of a new idea. It is realistic to assume that each time a new idea
emerges, individual scholars observe only a noisy signal of the underlying scientic potential.
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This bias is related to the education and scientic personality of the scholars, which, as all
human beings, are di¤erent. More precisely, let each scholar i 2 [0; 1] observe the following
signal:
xi =  + "i; (1)
where the bias "i  unif [ ;+]. In other words, the distribution of signals in the population
of scholars is centered around ; with xi  unif [(   ); ( + )].
In this case, beliefs are no longer common knowledge, and the problem has all the features
of a standard n-player global game as studied and solved for equilibrium by Morris and Shin
(1998, 2001). With this information structure, a researcher with a "skeptical assessment"
("i < 0) would not pay much attention to an idea with high scientic potential, whereas,
conversely, a researcher with an "enthusiastic assessment" ("i > 0) may decide to adopt a
rather weak new idea.
3 The threshold equilibrium
Following the resolution steps indicated by Atkeson (2001), we dene the cuto¤ scientic
value  (the state variable) such that:8>><>>:
for    the new strand of research emerges (`  v)
for  <  the new strand of research fails to to take-o¤ (` < v)
:
In relation to the cuto¤ state variable, there is a critical signal x, such that:8>><>>:
for x  x the scholar prefers to develop the new idea
for x < x the scholar prefers to work on the safe old topic
:
The equilibrium is thus characterized by the couple (; x) and by scholarsoptimal strategies
connected to these thresholds.
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a/ We can rst analyze how  is determined, for a predetermined critical signal x:
As already mentioned, when a new idea with a scientic value  is published, the distribu-
tion of signals in the population of scholars xi has mean : All scholars with xi > x will adopt
the new idea. For the time being we consider that the critical signal x is predetermined.
The number of scholars who decide to develop the new idea is:
`() = 1  Pr[xi  xj]; (2)
where:
Pr[xi  xj] =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
x    + 
2
for x 2 [(   ) ; ( + )]
0 for x < (   )
1 for x > ( + )
: (3)
All other things equal, the number of scholars who decide to adopt the new idea increases
with the (unobserved) scientic value of the idea, : Since the probability Pr[xi  xj] varies
between 0 and 1 depending on , there is a cuto¤ scientic value ; such that for  > ; we
have `() > v (the strand of research emerges), and for  < , we have `() < v (the new
strand fails). This cuto¤ scientic value  is implicitly dened by:
`() = v , 1  x
    + 
2
= v; (4)
or, in an equivalent way, as:
x    = (1  2v): (5)
b/ We then study how x is determined, considering that nature has drawn precisely the
cuto¤ scientic value,  (which is, for the time being, assumed to be predetermined).
The scholar assesses the probability that the new idea fails (Pr[ < ]) by considering
the distribution of  after observing the signal xi. Given that the ex-ante distribution of
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 is di¤use and that the bias is uniformly distributed around the realized ; its ex-post
distribution is uniform too: jxi  unif [(xi   ) ; (xi + )]:8
Given the denition of the threshold ; for  < ; the payo¤ of the scholar who adopts
the new idea is 0, and for  > ; his payo¤ is : We dene the expected payo¤ of a scholar
i; who observes a signal xi and chooses to adopt (A) the new idea by EA[uijxi].
EA[uijxi] =
Z +1

f(jxi)d = 1
2
Z xi+

d =
1
4

2
xi+

=
1
4
h
(xi + )
2   ()2
i
=
(xi + + 
) (xi +   )
4
: (6)
The expected gain is an increasing function in the signal xi:9
Among the mass of scholars, there is one who is indi¤erent between working in the new
eld or keeping with the old one. Let his signal be x: It is implicitly dened by:
EA[ujx] = s, (x
 + + ) (x +   )
4
= s: (7)
If a scholar has a signal xi > x; he will adopt the new idea, if not he will continue to develop
the old paradigm. Equation (7) indeed denes the cuto¤ signal.
c/ The system of equations (5) and (7) can be solved for the equilibrium cuto¤s:
 =
s
1  v   (1  v) ; (8)
and:
x =
s
1  v   v: (9)
8 In the alternative specication where   unif [0;+1); the ex-post distribution of  is jxi 
unif [max(0; xi   );+1): We obtain the same solution as for the distribution analyzed in the text for
 < s=(1  v2):
9 For xi >  : It can be checked latter on that the condition holds for the equilibrium x:
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It can be seen that, under the assumption of uniformly distributed  and ; the problem
presents a single threshold equilibrium, whatever the precision of the signal.
If the quality of the signal is good enough ( < sv
(1 v)2 ); then the equilibrium threshold 

is larger than s. This outcome has an interesting interpretation: in a decentralized research
organization, some "good ideas" (that is, ideas that have a scientic value that is greater than
the value of the old ideas ( 2 [s; ])) might be rejected because of strategic uncertainty. If
 2 [s; ]; scholars behave as if they "fear novelty"; in fact, their excessive cautiousness is
an equilibrium outcome as they rationally infer that the critical mass cannot be reached.
Notice that in the special case where  ! 0; that is when the precision of the signal is
almost perfect, the two equilibrium cuto¤s become:
 = x =
s
1  v > s: (10)
To sum up, in a scientic environment characterized by a relatively small level of noise
in the perception of the true scientic value of new ideas, some good ideas will never be
implemented.
On the other hand, scientic discovery was often subject to fads, where scholars massively
rush to develop an idea that ultimately proves to be completely wrong (Gardner, 1957;
Stephan, 1996; Abrahamson, 2009). In our model, if the quality of the signal is poor enough
( > sv
(1 v)2 ), then the equilibrium threshold 
 is lower than s: This means that in a state of
strong scientic uncertainty some "poor" ideas, that is ideas with a lower scientic value than
applications brought by the existing paradigm ( 2 [; s; ]); might lead to the emergence of
a new strand of research. Moreover, if uncertainty is very high (and v is small), even ideas
with a negative scientic value might be followed.
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It can be reasonably assumed that in science scholars face substantial uncertainty ( is
large). Yet, whether the equilibrium is characterized by  > s (fear of novelty) or by  < s
(fads), it depends to a large extent on the critical mass v: If v is large, then chances that the
rst situation prevails are high.
The analysis of the equilibrium allows us to perform some elements of comparative statics.
In the line of Kuhn (1962), Faria et al. (2011) argued that the capacity of an incumbent
paradigm to produce a ow of applications and developments can gradually fade away. In
our model, when the scientic contribution of the old school of thought decreases (ds < 0),
then the equilibrium cuto¤ () declines, and the likelihood that a new idea will initiate a
new school of thought, eventually replacing the old paradigm, should increase.10 In a more
powerful model, with repeated interactions, we can imagine that once a new idea is adapted,
the initial value of developing it is so high that the likelihood to get a much better one is
quite low. But over time it gets harder and harder to get results from the current idea, so the
threshold in equilibrium gets lower and lower, and another new idea can nd its way out.11
If the critical mass of researchers required for a new paradigm to emerge decreases (dv <
0), then  also declines, and the likelihood that a new idea will initiate new school of
thought increases. Advances in research dissemination prompted by the development of the
Internet (e.g., new journals and new open-access communication channels) have signicantly
increased the accessibility of scientic research in the last twenty years (Besancenot and
Vranceanu, 2014). These technological changes, if they allow for more rapid and e¢ cient
10 This e¤ect might be o¤set by a mechanism that is not outlined in our model, related to the inertia of
researchers that have invested too much in the old paradigm.
11 In such a repeated interaction model, we can consider that at t+1 the old paradigm delivers st+1 = t;
where  < 1 stands for a decay rate.
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dissemination and access to research, can support a reduction in the critical mass required
for a new research program to achieve legitimacy. In this case, we can foresee an acceleration
of the pace of adoption of new ideas, likely with a lower average scientic value.
4 Conclusion
The evolution of fundamental research frequently proceeds by means of major innovations
followed by long periods dedicated to the exploitation of results, during which time new ideas
fail to be launched. Several analyses have explained this pattern of scientic discovery by
scholarspreference for "conformity", in which researchers prefer to work within elds that
are not very far from the work of their peers (Brock and Durlauf, 1999; Bramoullé and Saint-
Paul, 2010). This paper provides an original explanation for this phenomenon that builds
on the methodology of coordination games with strategic complementarity and uncertainty
regarding the information structure, which are better known as "global games" (Carlsson
and Van Damme, 1993; Morris and Shin, 1998; 2001). In this context, observed conformity
appears as the natural consequence of scholarsaversion to strategic uncertainty.
In our model, the scientic value of new ideas is represented as a random variable with
a known statistical distribution. During each time period, a new idea emerges, and scholars
observe its scientic value (only) as a noisy signal. Our analysis has focused on the repre-
sentative stage of a repeated game with no learning across stages, thus with an invariant
statistical distribution of signals. Also, in our simplied model, the scholars payo¤ was
assumed to be a linear function in the social value of a collectively adopted idea. Thus the
model abstracts from possible divergences between the private and social value of scientic
discoveries. Further research could address these important questions.
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Under general statistical distributions of the state variable and signal noise, Morris and
Shin (1998, 2001) have shown that n-player global games can present no equilibrium, one
equilibrium or multiple equilibria. In general, it has been shown that such games presents
a single threshold equilibrium if private signals are su¢ ciently precise. In our paper, we
make the assumption of an uniformly distributed state variable and noise, and show that the
equilibrium is unique, whatever the variance of the signal. We then determine the equilibrium
cuto¤ scientic value above which a critical mass of scholars adopt the new idea (which leads
to the creation of a new school of thought) and below which they do not. It the precision of
the signal is high enough, this equilibrium cuto¤ scientic value is greater than the scientic
value of the ideas produced in the old paradigm. This nding is troubling because it indicates
that some good ideas will not be implemented simply because scholars take into account the
strategic coordination risk and behave as if they "fear novelty". To the contrary, if the
precision of the signal is low, the model explains why poor ideas are occasionally developed
and even followed for a long period, what was referred to as a fad in science.
According to our model, such ine¢ ciencies would appear as by-product of the decentral-
ized organization of research; to be sure, research competition specic to such an environment
can also result in important benets, such as greater e¤ort intensity, but this model cannot
account for such positive spillover, unfortunately. Furthermore, in many areas, the existing
organization of research is characterized by large research institutions sta¤ed with hundreds
of researchers and national funding agencies who set the research agenda for the eld. Given
the size of such institutions, if they decide to launch a new research program, then the critical
mass of scholars can be reached with certainty, and individual researchers need not fear the
16
coordination risk. Researchers should thus choose to work on that research topic, provided
that they perceive an expected reward that is larger than s. Unfortunately, if the large insti-
tution selects a poor idea (with a small or even negative ), it would then be responsible for
the emergence of a strand of research with modest scientic value. As an example, Diamond
(1996) recalls Milton Friedmans criticism of the US National Science Foundation, which, in
his opinion, has directed the economics profession toward a highly mathematical model.12
Coordination of e¤orts and investments is a critical requirement for the success of any re-
search programme or mission. Ideas developed in this paper suggest that global games might
provide a suitable methodology to analyze a broader range of problems in the economics of
science.
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